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INTEGRATION UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT:
ONCE AN EXEMPTION, NOT ALWAYS ....
By RONALD M. SHAPIRO*
and
ALAN R. SACHS**
Invent and Improve, directors and shareholders of a successful
and growing "private" company, Autotex, Inc., enter the office of
recently retained securities counsel and proudly display a "letter of
intent" that commits a reputable underwriting firm to "take their
company public" on good financial terms. They understand that the
public offering of Autotex's securities must fully comply with the fed-
eral securities laws and are ready, willing and able to go through the
rigors of the registration process prescribed by the Securities Act of
19331 (the Act). Several days later, however, elation is dampened
when counsel advises Invent and Improve that despite their desire to
comply scrupulously with the Act's registration provisions, it is possi-
ble that the company has already engaged in a course of conduct which
would be deemed a registration violation when it makes its proposed
public offering. Counsel explains that the corporate minute book re-
veals that Autotex issued shares of stock for significant consideration
to a number of persons during the year preceding the receipt of the
underwriter's letter of intent. Invent and Improve attempt to mollify
counsel's fears by stating that each of the prior issuances of stock was
a "private offering" by the company and was, therefore, exempt from
the registration provisions of the Act.' They further explain that each
purchaser took his shares for "investment" in order to preserve the
exemption.' Nevertheless, counsel informs his clients that, although
each of the earlier issuances of securities, considered separately (or
possibly even in combination), may have been cast in the mold of a
* Partner, Frank, Bernstein, Conaway & Goldman, Baltimore, Maryland;
Lecturer, University of Maryland School of Law; A.B., 1964, Haverford College;
LL.B., 1967, Harvard Law School.
** Associate, Frank, Bernstein, Conaway & Goldman, Baltimore, Maryland;
Lecturer, University of Baltimore School of Law; A.B., 1965, University of Mary-
land; LL.B., 1967, University of Maryland School of Law.
1. Securities Act §§ 5-8, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e-77g (1964).
2. Securities Act § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1964), exempts from the regis-
tration provisions "transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering." See
notes 21-29 infra and accompanying text.
3. See note 21 infra.
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private offering, these issuances may suddenly be deemed to have been
a public and non-exempt offering. The earlier, ostensibly private sales
of stock by the company may be "integrated" with each other and con-
sidered together as being merely components of one public offering;
or they may be integrated with the proposed public offering and con-
sidered a part of that public offering. Invent and Improve, believing
that the term "integration" somehow had legal significance only in the
civil rights area, now find that, by virtue of the securities law inte-
gration concept, they and their corporation may be confronted with
liability for failing to register.
The transformation, by operation of the integration doctrine, of an
offering's status from one of exemption to one of illegality as part of
an unregistered public offering is a phenomenon which is not limited
to situations in which the private offering exemption is claimed. The
status of offerings sought to be made pursuant to certain other exemp-
tions under the Act may be similarly altered as a result of integration.
This article will outline those exemptions most frequently affected
by integration and the circumstances under which integration will
most likely affect them. It will also suggest remedial solutions to pre-
sent integration problems and will propose guidelines which should be
enunciated by the Securities and Exchange Commission in order to
assist corporate counsel confronted with the maze of integration
predicaments.
I. THE ExEmPTIONS FROM REGISTRATION
Prior to an examination of specific applications of the integration
doctrine, it is necessary to examine briefly its foundations - the regis-
tration requirements and exemptions therefrom under the Act. The
registration provisions were designed to protect investors by promot-
ing full disclosure of information in the interstate distribution of
securities where the securities are publicly offered for sale by an issuing
company or by a person in control of such company.4 Accomplish-
ment of this objective is sought by requiring the issuer of such securi-
ties to file with the Commission a registration statement, including a
prospectus, containing financial and other information about the com-
pany's business and management and about the offering of its securi-
ties.5 Although the provision of the Act requiring registration is
itself couched in absolute terms, it is modified by two other sections of
the Act which provide exemptions from registration for certain types
of securities and transactions.6 Such exemptions permit a security
to be offered and sold without putting the issuer through the lengthy
and costly process of registration.7 Whether an offering will always
4. See Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 29 (1959).
5. Securities Act §§ 6-7, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77f-77g (1964).
6. Securities Act §§ 3-4, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c-77d (1964).
7. It is not uncommon for a first public offering to take as long as from four to
six months from the beginning of preparation to the effective date of the registration
statement. The expense of such offering, exclusive of underwriting commissions,
may be anticipated to range between $40,000 and $90,000 (including legal, accounting,
printing and filing fees). For a brief summary of steps which must be taken in order
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retain its exempt status, however, depends upon integration concepts.
The bases of these exemptions must first be comprehended before their
integration weaknesses are probed.
Exemptions from registration fall into two categories: (i) the
less common exemptions for particular types of securitiesS and (ii) the
exemptions for particular types of transactionsY The so-called "exempt-
securities" exemption is not subject to extinguishment by operation
of the integration rule. Because the availability of such an exemption
is not dependent upon the character of the transaction in which the
securities are offered for sale and sold, but rather upon the nature of
the security itself, its status is unaffected by offering activities of
the company, which activities are the focal point of integration. There-
fore, if a particular type of security is itself exempt, registration will
not be required for its offer and sale regardless of the nature of the
transaction, albeit public and interstate.
A. Transactional Exemptions - Section 3
Section 3 of the Act contains four transactional exemptions, three
of which have integration implications.' Of the latter, the first ex-
empts from the registration requirements those transactions in which
securities are exchanged by an issuer "with its existing security holders
exclusively" if no remuneration is paid for soliciting the exchange."
In addition to possible integration problems,' Commission regula-
tions 8 impose a "good faith" requirement on those claiming this ex-
emption in an attempt to insure that the exchange is not merely a step
in a plan to effectuate an unregistered public distribution of securities.
Factors considered by the Commission in determining whether or not
an exchange of securities is made in "good faith" include (i) the
length of time during which the securities received by the issuer were
outstanding prior to their surrender or exchange, (ii) the number of
holders of the securities originally outstanding, (iii) the marketability
of such securities, and (iv) whether the exchange was dictated by fi-
for a company to "go public," see Shapiro & Katz, The "Going Public Through the
Back Door" Phenomenon - An Assessment, 29 Mn. L. Rxv. 320, 321 (1969).
8. These exempt securities are generally those offered or sold to the public prior
to July 27, 1933; a broad range of government and bank securities; short-term
commercial paper; securities of non-profit organizations; securities of building and
loan and farmers' cooperative associations; securities of carriers subject to the juris-
diction of the Interstate Commerce Commission; certificates of receivers or trustees;
insurance policies and annuity contracts; and, under certain circumstances, securities
of small business investment companies. See Securities Act §§ 3(a) (1)-(8), 15
U.S.C. §§ 77c(a)(1)-(8) (1964).
9. A transaction which is exempt from registration may not, however, neces-
sarily be exempt from certain anti-fraud provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 and
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 which impose liability for material misstate-
ments or omissions in certain defined contexts. See Securities Act §§ 12, 17, 15
U.S.C. §§ 771, 77q (1964); Exchange Act § 10b, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964).
10. The exemption which is not affected by integration is set out in § 3(a) (10)
of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7 7c(a) (10) (1964), and applies to securities issued
in exchange for outstanding securities, in exchange for claims or property interests,
or "partly in exchange and partly for cash" under certain specified conditions.
11. Securities Act § 3(a)(9), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(9) (1964).
12. See note 39 infra.
13. 17 C.F.R. § 231.646 (1970).
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nancial considerations of the issuer rather than primarily in order to
enable one or a few persons to distribute their securities to the public.' 4
The remaining two section 3 exemptions are more commonly
invoked and are replete with integration problems. The first, section
3 (a)(11), exempts from the registration and prospectus require-
ments of the Act "[a]ny security which is a part of an issue offered
and sold only to persons resident within a single State or Territory,
where the issuer of such security is a person resident and doing busi-
ness within or, if a corporation, incorporated by and doing business
within, such State or Territory.' The Securities and Exchange Com-
mission has described this so-called "intrastate" exemption as being
designed only to apply to a local financing that, as a practical matter,
may be consummated in its entirety within the state or territory in
which the issuer is both incorporated and doing business. 6 Although
there is no limit on the dollar amount of the offering or on the number
of offerees, the availability of this exemption is specifically conditioned
upon the entire issue of securities being offered and sold exclusively
to residents of that particular state. The issuer's good faith in intend-
ing to sell only to residents of the state of issuance will not insure the
applicability of the exemption; the making of a single offer or sale
outside the state of issuance, regardless of the manner of such offer or
sale, will destroy the exemption for all the securities in that issue, in-
cluding those already sold pursuant to the exemption.' 7 All securities
offered for sale and sold as part of a single issue pursuant to this ex-
emption must "come to rest" in the hands of buyers actually residing
within the state of issuance, and the resident buyers must continue to
own the securities which they purchase in the offering until the distribu-
tion is completed.' 8
The other common section 3 transactional exemption is the so-
called "Regulation A" exemption promulgated by the Securities and
Exchange Commission pursuant to authority granted to it under
section 3(b) of the Act to exempt certain "small issues" of securities
from the registration requirements. 9 While qualification for exempt
status under Regulation A is not conditioned upon the offer or sale of
the issue being made within any numerical or geographical limita-
tions, the total offering price for the issue may not exceed $500,000
in any one year. Computation of the total offering price necessi-
14. Id.
15. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(11) (1964). For a recent discussion of this exemption, see
Chapman v. Dunn, 414 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1969).
16. Securities Act Release No. 4434 (Dec. 6, 1961). It must be emphasized that,
even if the corporation is a local one, the funds raised from the issuance of the
securities must be used for purposes primarily local in nature. SEC v. Truckee
Showboat, Inc., 157 F. Supp. 824 (S.D. Cal. 1957).
17. See SEC v. Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mortgage Exch., 186 F. Supp. 830,
871 (S.D. Cal.), aff'd, 285 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1960) ; SEC v. Hillsborough Inv. Corp.,
173 F. Supp. 86 (D.N.H. 1958), aff'd, 276 F.2d 665 (1st Cir. 1960). Even if the
securities sold outside the state could qualify for another exemption such as the
private offering exemption, such an extrastate offer or sale would destroy the intra-
state exemption. See Associated Investors Sec., Inc., First Equity Sec. Corp.,
Exchange Act Release No. 6859 (July 24, 1962).
18. Securities Act Release No. 4434 (Dec. 6, 1961).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1964) is the statutory authority; Regulation A consists
of SEC Rules 251-63, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-.263 (1970).
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tates careful consideration of the rules of the Regulation.2" Regulation
A requires that a Notification on Form 1-A and, in the case of
offerings in excess of $50,000, an Offering Circular be filed with an
appropriate regional office of the SEC; these filings are best described
as a simplified form of registration statement and prospectus. Despite
the need for documentation and occasional slowdowns in the SEC
regional offices, Regulation A provides a relatively quick means of
distributing a substantial quantity of securities on an interstate basis
without a rigorous audit and with less expense than is ordinarily
involved in making a registered offering.
B. Transactional Exemptions - Section 4
Section 4 of the Act creates four transactional exemptions, only
one of which has integration implications2 ' - the "private offering" ex-
20. SEC Rules 253-54, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.253-.254 (1970).
21. Securities Act § 4(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(l) (1964), exempts "transactions by
any person other than an issuer, underwriter, or dealer." While this particular
exemption does not have integration implications, it is necessary to understand the
effect thereof because, under the normal operation of the integration doctrine, a saleby an "underwriter" may be sufficient to trigger the integration of two or more
allegedly exempt offerings.
The major difficulty presented by this exemption is that of determining
whether or not an underwriter is involved in a secondary or resale transaction. At
the outset, it must be understood that, for a person to be an underwriter within the
meaning of the statute, he need not be in the investment banking business, but may
be a mere investor who makes a sale of unregistered stock that is subject to invest-
ment restrictions. The person who purchases unregistered stock from the issuer "with
a view to, or offers or sells for an issuer in connection with, the distribution of"
such security will be considered to be a statutory underwriter. Securities Act § 2(11),
15 U.S.C. § 77b(11) (1964). The Securities Act does not provide any specific guide
with respect to the meaning of "a distribution," the key concept used in ascertaining
whether or not a person is a statutory underwriter. Recently, the Commission inSecurities Act Release No. 5087 (Sept. 22, 1970) issued proposed Rule 144, which
attempts to inject a degree of objectivity into the determination of whether an under-
writer is involved in a transaction. Among other requirements, the proposed ruleprovides that an eighteen-month period must elapse before securities acquired in a
non-public offering may be offered for sale. This proposed rule has been consistently
criticized for its lack of clarity, see, e.g., WANDER, PROPOSED RULE 144, THE REvIEW
OF SECURITIES REGULATION 843 (1970), and may not be adopted by the Commission.
For a discussion of the rules originally proposed by the Wheat Report to inject
objectivity into the "distribution" problem, see Shapiro & Katz, note 7 supra, at 332.A further important qualification of a section 4(1) exemption relates to the
meaning of the word "issuer" as used for purposes of determining whether another
person is an "underwriter." In addition to the issuing company, the term "issuer" is
defined to include "any person directly or indirectly controlling or controlled by theissuer, or any person under direct or indirect common control with the issuer."
Securities Act § 2(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(11) (1964). The public distribution of
unregistered securities by a control person is severely limited by the strict terms
of this exemption because of the inevitable involvement in such distribution of a
middleman or statutory underwriter. The wide-reaching definitions of "control per-
sons" or "control groups" further deflate the effectiveness of the section 4(1) exemp-
tion. While directors, officers and principal shareholders are commonly considered
to comprise a control group, the term "control group," the term "control" as well as
the terms "controlling," "controlled by," and "under common control with" also mean,inter alia, "the possession, direct or indirect, of the power to direct or cause the direc-
tion of the management and policies of a person, whether through the ownership of
voting securities, by contract, or otherwise." 17 C.F.R. § 230.405(f) (1969). For
an excellent discussion of the multi-faceted concept of control, see Sommer, Who's in
Control? - S.E.C., 21 Bus. LAWYER 559 (1966).
There are two transactional exemptions set forth in section four which do
give some exemptional leeway to "dealers" and also to "control" persons or groups
who may not otherwise avail themselves of the section 4(1) exemption. One of these
1971]
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emption, which ranks ahead of the intrastate and Regulation A ex-
emptions as that most commonly relied upon. Despite the fact that
significant problems are generally involved in qualifying for the ex-
emption, it has appeal because it is not subject to the geographic pa-
rameters of the intrastate exemption and does not involve the dollar
limitations of Regulation A.
Private offerings or, in the language of section 4(2), "transac-
tions by an issuer not involving any public offering," are exempted
from the registration requirements of the Act.2" While neither the Act
nor the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder provide a uni-
versally applicable definition of the statutory term "public offering,"
the Commission has suggested several significant criteria which may
be used in order to determine whether an offering is public.2 3 These
include the number of offerees and their relationship to the issuer (in-
cluding their access to relevant information and their ability to fend
for themselves in matters of investments), the number of units of se-
curities offered, the size of the offering, and the manner in which it
is made.
The most popular conception of a non-public offering is that made
to a limited number of persons. To the extent that mere numbers may
bear on the determination of whether an offering is public, it is the
number of offerees, and not the number of actual purchasers, which
is the crucial factor. It cannot be said that a precise maximum num-
ber of offerees exists above which the offering will no longer be con-
sidered private. As a practical matter, however, an offering to twenty
or thirty offerees will not be disputed by the SEC except in unusual
circumstances. 24 But there is a popular misconception that the num-
bers game alone will be determinative of the existence of a private
offering exemption. It is important to realize that a numbers test is
reflective only of custom and practice and not of the technical state of
the law. As a purely legal matter, regardless of how small the number
of offerees is kept, an offering cannot be considered "private" within
the meaning of section 4(2) unless both the nature of the offerees and
provisions, section 4(4), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(4) (1964), is intended to free brokers from
the registration requirements when they are engaged in ordinary trading transactions
on behalf of control persons, as distinguished from participating in the distribution
of securities. See also SEC Rule 133, 17 C.F.R. § 230.133 (1970) ; SEC Rule 154,
17 C.F.R. § 230.154 (1970). The second transactional exemption, section 4(3), 15
U.S.C. § 77d(3) (1964), is a strictly circumscribed exemption for certain trans-
actions made by a dealer qua dealer "and not transactions by dealers qua under-
writers." L. Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION 2329 (Supp. 1969).
22. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1964). As with other exemptions, the burden of
proving the availability of this exemption is upon the claimant. SEC v. Ralston
Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
23. Securities Act Release No. 4552 (Nov. 6, 1962).
24. As to the limited significance of the twenty-five offeree "rule of thumb," see
United States v. Custer Channel Wing Corp., 376 F.2d 675 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 850 (1967); Hayden Lynch & Company, Inc., Exchange Act Release No.
7935 (Aug. 10, 1966); Schimmer v. Webster, 225 A.2d 888 (D.C. Ct. App. 1967).
See also SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953). In proposed Rule 181
the Commission has proposed that, in the very limited context of an acquisition
transaction, an offering to not more than twenty-five offerees (including as one
offeree certain closely related holders) is not a public offering. Securities Act
Release No. 5012 (Oct. 9, 1969), Exchange Act Release No. 8711 (Oct. 9, 1969).
For a discussion of proposed Rule 181, see Shapiro & Katz, note 7 supra, at 339.
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their relationship to the issuer fulfill certain criteria. In Securities &
Exchange Commission v. Ralston Purina Co.,25 the Supreme Court
stated that, in order for an offering to qualify as a private offering,
the offerees must be able to "fend for themselves" in obtaining and
evaluating information which would be considered essentially equiva-
lent to the content of a registration statement.20 This decision rested
on the fact that the private offering exemption was included in the Act
on the theory that the disclosure which would otherwise have been
required by the Act was unnecessary where securities were offered to
sophisticated investors; closely regulated disclosure was required only
where offerings were made to members of the general public. Thus,
to secure the exemption on firmer ground than a mere limit on the
number of offerees, it is crucial that the issuer assure itself that the
offerees are sophisticated and have either a sufficiently close relation-
ship with the issuer and its management or sufficient leverage to obtain
full disclosure and thereby become fully knowledgeable about the
issuer. In addition, even if all offerees have the requisite ability to
"fend for themselves," all purchasers involved in the transaction must
take the securities for investment purposes and not with a view to their
distribution. If but one of such purchasers shortly thereafter makes
a public resale, 28 that purchaser would be presumed to be a statutory
underwriter ;29 and, unless the presumption were rebutted, the entire
offering would lose its private status.
This discussion of the private offering exemption concludes a
brief explanation of the exemptions from the registration rigors of the
Securities Act of 1933 which may fall prey to the integration doctrine.
Those exemptions most commonly relied upon by issuers not only re-
quire a careful understanding of their provisions, but also frequently
demand analysis of their integration implications before the issuer can
offer and sell its securities within the safe harbor of an exemption
from registration.
II. THE INTEGRATION DOCTRINE
Policy determinations at the congressional level led to codifica-
tion of the various exemptions from the registration provisions of the
Act. The doctrine of integration, however, developed administratively
as part of an effort by the SEC to restrict use of the exemptions to
situations within the scope of the policies upon which they were based.
The basic abuse at which the integration doctrine was specifically aimed
25. 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
26. See Ralston Purina Co. v. SEC, 346 U.S. 119 (1953); Value Line Fund,Inc. v. Marcus, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 91,523, at 94,971 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). See also
United States v. Custer Channel Wing Corp., 376 F.2d 675 (4th Cir. 1967). For an
extensive discussion of "qualified offerees," see Shapiro & Katz, note 7 supra, at 324-29.
27. The existence of these factors does not reduce the responsibility of the issuer
to make full disclosure so as to be in compliance with the anti-fraud provisions of
both the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Securities Act of 1933.
28. If, however, a purchaser makes a resale found to be private2 i.e., not in
connection with a distribution by him thereof, then he would not be an 'underwriter"
within the meaning of section 2(11) ; his resale would be exempt from registration
under section 4(1).
29. See note 21 supra.
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was the artificial fragmentation of a single non-exempt, public issue
of securities into what appeared to be one or more separate offerings,
for each of which an exemption from the registration requirements
would, but for integration, have been available. The heart of the inte-
gration doctrine, the concept of treating all of the parts of such an
artificially fragmented issue as a "single issue," became the device
with which the Commission limited the otherwise free accessibility to
such exemptions.
The far-reaching effects of integration, especially upon the un-
wary, can best be demonstrated by viewing its potential application in
a typical factual setting - the organization of the closely-held, but
potentially public, corporation. Let us assume that in our previous
hypothetical, Invent and Improve, prior to incorporation, obtained
United States Letters Patent on an electronic specialty unit, the
"Autotex," a device easily adaptable for use in most computer systems
which accomplishes a heretofore manually performed operation. A
functional prototype was built and exhibited to the computer industry
and was warmly received. Invent and Improve, after careful consid-
eration, decided to manufacture and market the Autotex themselves -
initially in a form usable in only one of the larger computers, the manu-
facturer of which has already placed a firm order for one thousand
units. With the prototype and purchase order in hand, but with no
capital in pocket, the inventors retain legal counsel to organize their
business and to assist in financing the commencement of its operations.
The business is incorporated as Autotex, Inc., a Maryland cor-
poration, which is authorized to issue 100,000 shares of common
stock. In exchange for the assignment to the corporation of the Auto-
tex Letters Patent, each of the inventors is issued 10,000 shares of the
corporation's stock. Invent and Improve estimate that a minimum of
$50,000 will be required to begin limited manufacture of the Autotex.
The corporation makes a "private offering"8 of 5,000 shares of the
corporation's common stock at the price of $10 per share in order
to raise the needed funds. It is thought that this manner of financing
would permit the investors to share in the potential growth of the
corporation through their equity position while allowing Invent and
Improve to retain working control. In the discussions between coun-
sel and the inventors at this stage, it is mentioned that, if the corpora-
tion were successful with its initial venture, larger amounts of capital
to finance expanded operations could later be obtained through a
"public offering" of the corporation's securities. The initial 5,000
shares are offered and sold "privately" to twenty-five friends and rela-
tives of Invent and Improve, all of whom, with the exception of one
New Yorker, reside in the State of Maryland. In connection with the
private offering, counsel carefully requires each of the investors to
execute an "investment letter" in which the purchaser warrants that
the shares are being acquired for investment only.31 Each stock cer-
tificate is stamped with a legend prohibiting any transfer of the cer-
tificate which would be in violation of the Act.
30. See notes 21-27 supra and accompanying text
31. See note 21 supra.
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The capital so raised is prudently put to work by Invent and
Improve, and the corporation begins to manufacture the 1,000 Auto-
tex units. For a period of six months, operations proceed normally
until Invent and Improve come to the harsh realization that they have
drastically underestimated working capital requirements and that sub-
stantial amounts of additional capital will be required to complete the
1,000-unit order. They impulsively telephone counsel and request that
he do whatever is legally necessary to have a second private offering of
an additional $25,000.
This is the point at which serious integration problems may
arise. If a second offering were now attempted, the corporation would
be faced with a substantial possibility that the Commission would in-
tegrate the first offering with the second and consider the combination
as a single offering. Such integration would present no problem to the
issuer if the integrated offering were non-public; it would remain ex-
empt from registration by virtue of section 4(2). However, if the
single issue resulting from the integration of two ostensibly private
offerings is deemed a public offering, then the corporation will have
violated the registration provisions of the Act. Integration of two
"private" offerings into one "public" offering will depend upon the
issuer's basis for claiming private offering exemptions for the two
heretofore separate offerings. If both are offerings only to persons
who meet the qualifications set forth in Ralston Purina for private
offerees - that is, if all of the offerees have the requisite ability to
"fend for themselves" - then the two offerings are private as a matter
of case law; and their integration would not alter the private status of
the resulting single issue because all of the offerees would still have
met the Ralston Purina tests. On the other hand, if the basis for the
claim of private offering status for one or both of the offerings was
merely numerical and if not all of the offerees in both offerings met
the Ralston Purina tests, then there is no basis for claiming that the
integrated single offering is private.
If an issuer is to maintain a private exemption for the integrated
offering, both of the ostensibly private offerings must conform to the
Ralston Purina tests. If the claim of private status for either of the
offerings is not supported by law, then the integrated single issue will
not be entitled to that exemption. The reason for this is clear. The
application of the doctrine of integration to two or more ostensibly
private offerings of securities is based upon the Commission's literal
construction of the language of section 4(2). The Commission early
took the position that section 4(2) did "not exempt every transaction
which [was] not itself a public offering, but only transactions "not
involving any public offering.' ",32 Since only a transaction or an offer-
ing of securities not "involving" a public offering was itself exempt
from registration, the Commission's inquiry into a claim of section
4(2) exemption extended far beyond the distinct offering for which
such exemption was claimed. If the offering for which the exemption
was claimed together with other offerings of the issuer comprised but
fragmented parts of what was a "single issue" of securities, then all
32. Securities Act Release No. 2029 (Aug. 8, 1939) (emphasis added).
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cf the offerings would be integrated and, if deemed to be public in
nature, would be subject to the registration provisions of the Act. In
the language of the Commission: "[A]n issuer . . .may not separate
parts of a series of related transactions comprising an issue of securi-
ties and thereby seek to establish that a particular part is a private
transaction if the whole involves a public offering of its securities."33
Accordingly, whenever reliance is placed on a section 4(2) exemption
for two or more private offerings of securities, closely related in time,
the issuer is immediately and squarely faced with a "single issue" ques-
tion and thus the potential applicability of the integration doctrine.
The criteria which the Commission will apply in determining
whether such a single issue exists are listed in Securities Act Release
No. 4552:
A determination whether an offering is public or private would
also include a consideration of the question whether it should be
regarded as a part of a larger offering made or to be made. The
following factors are relevant to such question of integration:
whether (1) the different offerings are part of a single plan of
financing, (2) the offerings involve issuance of the same class of
security, (3) the offerings are made at or about the same time,
(4) the same type of consideration is to be received, (5) the
offerings are made for the same general purpose.3 4
A prior release, 3  however, indicates that the single-issue ques-
tion need not be resolved on the basis of all criteria set forth in Release
No. 4552; the inapplicability of two or more such criteria may justify
a determination that the several offerings do not constitute a single
issue. In Securities Act Release No. 2029, the General Counsel of the
Commission was requested to opine as to the applicability of sections
3(a) (9) and 4(2) of the Act to the following facts. The issuer had
an "open end" mortgage on its property with an issue of bonds desig-
nated as Series A outstanding thereunder. It proposed to create two
new series of bonds under the mortgage, to be called Series B and
Series C bonds, respectively, for the purpose of refunding the out-
standing bonds. The proposed Series B and Series C bonds differed
from each other in respect to maturity date, interest rate, redemption
prices and default provisions. It was contemplated that the Series B
bonds would be offered in exchange to the holders of the outstanding
Series A bonds on the basis of an equal principal amount of Series B
bonds for those of Series A, with interest adjustment. The necessary
funds to redeem any unexchanged Series A bonds would be raised by
the sale for cash of Series C bonds. The issuer proposed to offer and
sell the Series C bonds to no more than twelve insurance companies.
Initially, the General Counsel pointed out that, if the
proposed exchange offer and the proposed cash offer were isolated
transactions, . ..no registration under the Securities Act would
33. Crowell-Collier Publishing Co., Securities Act Release No. 3825 (Aug.
12, 1957).
34. Securities Act Release No. 4552 (Nov. 6, 1962) (emphasis added).
35. Securities Act Release No. 2029 (Aug. 8, 1939).
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be required. The Series B bonds would be exempted as securities
"exchanged by the issuer with its existing security holders exclu-
sively where no commission or other remuneration is paid or given
directly or indirectly for soliciting such exchange;" and the offer-
ing and sale of the Series C bonds would be exempted by [section
4(2)], as "transactions by an issuer not involving any public
offering. 31 6
The difficulty was encountered by reason of the "interdependence of the
two offerings." With respect to the section 4(2) exemption, the Gen-
eral Counsel concluded that "the exemption is not available to securi-
ties privately offered if any other securities comprised within the same
issue are made the subject of a public offering. ' ' I T The question, there-
fore, was limited to whether or not the Series B and Series C bonds
were separate issues or merely parts of a single issue. The General
Counsel held that the two offerings would not be deemed to be one
issue due to the different classes of the bonds and the rights appur-
tenant to each class, stating:
Whatever may be the precise limits of the concept of "issue"
when all securities involved are of the same class, I do not believe
that securities of different classes can fairly be deemed parts of a
single "issue."
... In expressing this opinion I do not mean to imply that
any difference in the incidents of two blocks of securities, how-
ever trivial, renders the blocks separate classes and consequently
separate "issues" for the purposes of the Act. In this case, how-
ever, the differences between the Series B and Series C bonds
are . . . sufficiently substantial to warrant treating them as
separate classes even though they will be issued under the same
mortgage indenture."'
When the criteria set forth in Release No. 4552 for resolution of
the "single-issue" question are applied to the facts underlying the two
proposed offerings considered in Release No. 2029, it is clear that the
offerings differed only in the class of security involved and the type of
consideration received by the issuer for the securities of each class.
Yet these differences alone were, in the opinion of the Commission's
General Counsel, sufficient to allow the SEC to treat the offerings as
two separate issues and thus to preclude integration. 9
36. Id.
37. Id. (emphasis added).
38. Id. The rules applicable to private offerings of stock are intensified upon
application to privately placed convertible securities. With respect to problems of
private offering requirements in connection with convertible securities, see Securities
Act Release No. 4450 (1962) and Securities Act Release No. 4248 (1960). See also
Gadsby, Private Placement of Convertible Securities, 15 Bus. LAWYER 470 (1960).
39. In determining the applicability of the section 3(a) (9) exemption to the
facts stated in Securities Act Release No. 2029, the General Counsel was confronted
with the same single-issue question that was presented by the claim of the section
4(1) exemption.
Although the section 3(a)(9) exemption contained no language expressly
limiting the applicability thereof to securities forming "part of an issue the whole
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The case of Value Line Fund, Inc. v. Marcus 40 involved the
only express, albeit cursory, judicial application of the Commission's
criteria for determining whether several allegedly private offerings
constitute a single issue. In Value Line, the defendant corporation,
whose shares of common stock were listed on the New York Stock
Exchange, had been engaged in a program of corporate acquisitions.
Although the opinion is not entirely clear, it appears that such
acquisitions were financed by the defendant corporation through the
issuance, on an investment letter basis, of notes convertible into shares
of its common stock in exchange for eighty percent of the outstand-
ing securities of each of the acquired corporations. Between 1955 and
1956, the defendant corporation acquired twenty such subsidiaries;
and a section 4(2) exemption was relied upon for the issuance of its
unregistered convertible notes in connection with each such acquisi-
tion.
During June, 1956, the plaintiff corporations purchased through
the defendant Van Alstyne, Noel & Co., a member broker of the New
York Stock Exchange acting as principal, large blocks of the defend-
ant corporation's unregistered common stock. This stock had been
owned by the latter's president, who was also joined as a defendant.
The defendant broker made the sales involved in reliance upon the
offering having been exempt from registration under section 4(1)
because the sale was by a person "other than an issuer, underwriter,
or dealer."'" A year later, following a drastic decline in the value of
the defendant corporation's common stock, the plaintiffs instituted
suit, claiming, inter alia, that they were entitled to rescind their
purchase of the stock from the defendant Van Alstyne, Noel & Co.
Among the grounds claimed for rescission was the allegation that
the sale of the defendant president's stock should be integrated
with the earlier offerings of the defendant corporation's securities
in connection with its acquisition program.4 2 Plaintiffs further con-
of which is sold as specified in the exempting provision," the General Counsel held
that, based upon the use of the word "exclusively" in section 3(a)(9), "the exemp-
tion [was] available only to securities constituting part of an issue which, as a whole,
is exchanged in conformity with the requirements of the section" (emphasis added) :
At first reading . . . Section 3(a)(9) appears to confer exemption upon any
security exchanged with the issuer's existing security holders, even though other
securities of the same class, as a part of the same plan of financing, are sold
to others than existing security holders, or to existing security holders otherwise
than by way of exchange. Such a construction, however, gives insufficient weight
to the use of the word "exclusively," as employed both in Section 3(a) (9) and
in its predecessor, former Section 4(3). In neither section is the grammatical
function of the word entirely clear; but in order to avoid an interpretation which
would reject the word as pure surplusage, it is necessary to adopt the view that
the exemption is available only to securities constituting part of an issue which,
as a whole, is exchanged in conformity with the requirements of the section.
Since the General Counsel concluded that the Series B and Series C bonds constituted
securities of different classes and thus were separate issues, the section 3(a) (9)
exemption was held to be applicable.
40. CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. f 91,523, at 94,971 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
41. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (1964). See note 21 supra.
42. It is the position of the Commission that, when a company is engaged in a
continuous program of issuing securities in connection with acquisitions, the entire
series of "private offerings" pursuant to which the acquisitions are made will be
integrated into one public offering; and the securities, therefore, must be registered.
See Prospectus of American Marietta Co. (Feb. 24, 1961).
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tended that the totality of such integrated transactions amounted
to a public offering with respect to which the defendant Van
Alstyne, Noel & Co. was a statutory underwriter. The court held
to the contrary, succinctly stating, "We do not think such an 'inte-
gration' is warranted on the facts of this case because (1) the offer-
ings sought to be integrated were by two different persons; (2) they
were not a part of a single plan of financing; (3) they involved dif-
ferent classes of securities; (4) they were not made at the same time;
(5) they were not for the same kind of consideration . . .and (6)
they were not for the same general purpose. 43
Although Value Line did not present a difficult integration ques-
tion, it is significant for two reasons. First, the District Court for the
Southern District of New York was the first expressly and literally to
apply each of the factors deemed relevant by the Commission in deter-
mining the applicability of the integration doctrine. Second, a sixth
test was added by the Value Line court - whether the offerings were
made by the same person; and it is noteworthy that the court con-
sidered its additional test prior to any of the Commission's.
When each of the factors enunciated by the Commission and
adopted in Value Line are applied to the facts of the Autotex problem,
the risk that will be incurred by our hypothetical corporation in making
its proposed second offering is evident. The securities involved in
both offerings will be of the same class and will be issued for the same
form of consideration, cash. The proximity in time of the offerings is
apparent. Moreover, the transactions arguably will be made for the
same purpose - to raise sufficient working capital to meet the initial
operating needs of the corporation. And although the proposed private
offering was conceived of at a later time, it is possible that both transac-
tions would be viewed by the Commission as being but parts of a
single plan to finance the operations of the corporation. Therefore, if
all offerees do not qualify as private offerees under Ralston Purina,
the Commission would refuse to consider this plan as effecting a
single integrated private offering.
Not wishing to face the vagaries of the Ralston Purina test as
applied to the proposed new offerees, with the risk that the two offer-
ings would be integrated into one illegal public offering, counsel
and client decide to abandon the proposed private offering. In-
stead, Invent and Improve conclude that, even though the registra-
tion provisions of the Act have frustrated this second attempt to raise
funds on a non-public basis, the same provisions can be utilized as a
vehicle to obtain a potentially larger amount of capital on a public
basis. Disposed toward relinquishing to investors a much greater
portion of the equity in the corporation and already acclimated to the
costs incident to securities transactions, Invent and Improve advise
counsel to begin the immediate preparation of a registration statement
for a registered public offering under the Act.
They soon discover, however, that the integration doctrine is not
limited in application merely to two or more ostensibly private trans-
actions. The Commission has applied the single issue concept to
43. CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. fr 91,523, at 94,971 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
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integrate a prior private offering with a subsequent registered public
offering. Cameron Industries, Inc.14 was a proceeding under section
8(d) of the Act 45 to determine whether or not a stop order should
issue suspending the effectiveness of a registration statement which
had been filed by the issuer with respect to a proposed public offering
of 300,000 shares of its common stock. Within a six-month period
ending during the month in which the registration statement was filed,
the issuer had sold 291,500 shares of its common stock. In the issuer's
prospectus it was stated that the sale of the 291,500 shares had been
exempt from registration under section 4(2). Of the 291,500 shares,
23,500 were sold directly by the issuer to three persons for approxi-
mately $10,000. The remaining 268,000 shares were distributed to
various persons through a promoter of the issuer.
The Division of Corporate Finance of the Commission argued
that all of the alleged private offerings were a part of the issue of
common stock publicly offered pursuant to the issuer's registration
statement and should be integrated with that public offering. The
issuer contended that the sales of the 23,500 shares constituted an
exempt "pre-under-writing offering"4 designed to "raise funds to pay
general corporate expenses, including the costs in connection with the
contemplated public offering"4 7 of its securities and that the sales of
the remaining shares were also private transactions exempt under
section 4(2). Despite the fact that the stock certificates representing
the 23,500 shares were legended with the traditional representation of
investment intent and provisions restricting their subsequent transfer
in violation of the Act, the Commission held that the "sale of these
shares was made in connection with and as part of a plan for the public
distribution of [the issuer's] securities."4 8 With respect to the remain-
ing 268,000 shares, the Commission found "the issuance and distribution
of such shares [to be] an integral part of the public offering of [the
issuer's] shares proposed pursuant to the registration statement filed
shortly thereafter."4 9 As a result, the Commission integrated all of
the prior private offerings into the subsequent public offering and
held that the exemption claimed in the issuer's prospectus for the prior
offerings was not available. The prior sales, therefore, were held to
have been in violation of the registration provisions of the Act. Ac-
cordingly, the issuer's registration statement was found to be materially
misleading in that it falsely represented that the sales of 291,500 shares
of the issuer's stock were exempt from registration and in that it
failed to disclose the issuer's contingent liabilities resulting therefrom."'
While Cameron Industries was decided in the context of an ad-
ministrative proceeding and involved the imposition of a stop order
suspending the effectiveness of the issuer's registration statement, the
ramifications of the decision from a civil standpoint are clear. A
44. 39 S.E.C. 540 (1959).
45. 15 U.S.C. § 77h(d) (1964).
46. 39 S.E.C. at 546.
47. Id.
48. Id. (emphasis added).
49. Id. (emphasis added).
50. See SEC Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210.3-19(g).
[VOL. XXXI
INTEGRATION UNDER SECURITIES ACT
judicial integration would result in civil liability being asserted against
the issuer and its controlling persons under sections 11,5 1 12 (1) and
(2),5" and 17' 3 of the Act and under sections 18(a), 4 10(b)55 and Rule
10(b) (5)6 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
Despite the rather vague language used by the Commission injustifying integration in Cameron Industries, the Commission has in-
dicated that it will apply the identical factors57 that it deemed relevant
in connection with the integration of two or more private offerings
to the determination of whether or not a prior private offering should
be construed to have been a part of a subsequent public offering made
pursuant to a registration statement. The language of Securities Act
Release No. 4552 clearly recognizes that a private offering may be "a
part of a larger offering made or to be made. .. ."
The implications of Cameron Industries and the factors contained
in Securities Act Release No. 4552 should be viewed in conjunction
with Rule 152,58 which has been promulgated by the Commission
under authority given it in the Act. Rule 152 provides: "The phrase
'transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering' in Sec-
tion 4(2) shall be deemed to apply to transactions not involving any
public offering at the time of said transactions although subsequently
thereto the issuer decides to make a public offering and/or files a
registration statement." Although the language of Rule 152 is am-
biguous, the Cameron Industries factual scenario can easily be read as
falling outside the penumbra of protection afforded by the rule's lan-
guage. Not only had the issuer in Cameron Industries reached a de-
cision with an underwriter relative to the exact terms of the proposed
public offering prior to the time that the illegal sales were made, but,
in fact, the sale of at least the 23,500-share block was considered by
the issuer itself to be merely a vehicle to finance the subsequent
registration.
At the same time, it is questionable whether Rule 152 adds any-
thing to the factors that the Commission will apparently consider in
determining whether or not it will integrate a private transaction
with a subsequent public offering. If the two offerings are part of a
single plan of financing, involving the issuance of the same class of
securities for the identical type of consideration and made at or about
the same time and for the same general purpose, it is clear that the
first offering would be deemed by the Commission to constitute a part
of, and thus "involve," the subsequent public offering at the time that
the private offering was made; therefore, the first offering would not
be a transaction contemplated by Rule 152. Moreover, once it has
been determined by the Commission that the first offering constituted
a part of, and therefore involved, a subsequent public offering, it is
51. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1964).
52. 15 U.S.C. § 771(1)-(2) (1964).
53. 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1964).
54. 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1964).
55. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(b) (1964).
56. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1970).
57. See text accompanying note 34 supra.
58. 17 C.F.R. § 230.152 (1970).
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normally implicit in such a determination that the issuer had "decided"
to make the public offering at the time of the first private transaction.
Accordingly, if the prior private offering is deemed to "involve" a
public offering at the time it is made, the determination of when the
"decision" was made to make the subsequent public offering has, in
effect, been made. Thus, Rule 152 appears to be inapplicable to cases
in which the doctrine of integration has been applied in accordance
with the tests enunciated by the Commission.
Rule 152 also presents several interpretative questions. The rule
is couched in negative terms: the fact that an issuer decides after
making a private offering to make a subsequent public offering shall
not preclude private exemption status for the first offering. The rule
does not provide in absolute terms, however, that the section 4(2) ex-
emption shall be applicable to a prior private offering unless the issuer
had decided at the time of that offering to make a subsequent public
offering. It is arguable that the section 4(2) exemption may still be
denied to the first offering, despite the fact that the issuer's decision
to make a public offering was arrived at subsequent to the first offer-
ing, if the Commission should determine that integration is otherwise
appropriate. For the SEC to make such a determination, despite the
subsequent decision to go public, would require it to ignore the absence
of a single financing plan and to base its decision upon the more objec-
tive integration criteria, i.e., that the offerings were made at or about
the same time, and involved the issuance of the same class of securities,
for the same type of consideration. It may be arguable that a decision
by the Commission to integrate should not hinge upon the presence of
intent on the part of the issuer to effect a single financing scheme.
Nevertheless, it is at least questionable whether the issuer should be
subjected to a full panoply of penalties for a violation of the Act which
results from integration when Rule 152 is otherwise complied with.
A nice question is also presented with respect to the negative im-
plications arising from Rule 152. Is an issuer always precluded from
relying on a section 4(2) exemption for an otherwise private offer-
ing of its securities if the issuer has already "decided" to make a sub-
sequent public offering - regardless of the nature of, and the circum-
stances surrounding, the public offering? Initially, the mere fact that,
at the time a private offering is made, an issuer has "decided to make
a subsequent public offering" should not per se preclude the applica-
bility of a section 4(2) exemption to the private transaction. Unless
the subsequent public offering actually takes place, the issuer's firm
intention to make such an offering is irrelevant to the issue of whether
the first offering was entitled to a section 4(2) exemption. The initial
offering would be entitled to such an exemption unless it is integrated,
and for integration to occur there must be a subsequent offering.
Moreover, assuming that the subsequent public offering is attempted,
the fact that the issuer had decided to do so at the time of the initial
offering still should be considered only in connection with the other
factors deemed relevant by the Commission respecting the integration
question. In particular, such a "decision" would be relevant to the
question of whether or not the offerings constituted a part of a "single
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plan" of financing. To construe the negative implications of Rule 152
in any other manner would clearly preclude the applicability of section
4l (2) to the numerous instances in which there exists no policy reason
for prohibiting exempt status from attaching to a private offering de-
spite a prior or contemporaneous decision to make a subsequent public
offering. Such instances would include a private offering made to
institutional investors to raise needed working capital when the issuer
had previously "decided" to register its securities for distribution
under a stock option plan or in connection with the acquisition of
another company.
In addition to the problem of determining the extent to which a
contemporaneous decision to make a subsequent public offering will
bear on the Commission's determination of whether integration is
appropriate, there is the problem of defining what is meant by a "de-
cision." Specifically, to what point must an issuer have proceeded in
order to be deemed to have made a "decision" respecting the subse-
quent public offering? It would seem that, unless and until there has
been a substantial formulation of the terms of the subsequent public
offering, the issuer should not be deemed to have made a "decision"
with respect thereto. Any broader standard would raise difficult ques-
tions for a corporation, such as Autotex, that has merely contemplated
or discussed a future public offering of its securities as part of its
normal process of growth.
Returning to our Autotex hypothetical, it has been demonstrated
that the integration doctrine could be applied to preclude the corpora-
tion from making a second private offering in reliance upon section
4(2) and from making a registered public offering of its securities
under the registration provisions of the Act. Rule 152 does not seem
to affect these results. The integration doctrine will also effectively
preclude the corporation from issuing its common stock in reliance
upon exemptions other than section 4(2), most notably the section
3 (a)(11) "intrastate" offering exemption59 and the Regulation A
exemption. 0
The section 3(a) (11) exemption is, by its very terms, available
only to a security "which is a part of an issue"6' of securities offered
and sold only to residents of a single state if the other requirements
of the exemption are met. Accordingly, the "single-issue" concept and
its concomitant doctrine of integration have an even clearer linguistic
basis for application by the Commission to this exemption than to the
section 4(2) exemption.
Neither the Act nor the regulations promulgated by the Commis-
sion thereunder define "issue" or "part of an issue." However, in
Shaw v. United States, 2 the only case to construe the meaning of
"issue" as used in section 3(a)(11), the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit held that the determination of what constitutes an "issue"
of securities under section 3(a) (11) is not governed by state law.
59. See notes 15-20 supra and accompanying text.
60. See notes 19-20 supra and accompanying text.
61. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(11) (1964) (emphasis added).
62. 131 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1942).
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The defendant-appellant had argued that "each sale or exchange of
originally issued shares of a common character [was] a separate issue
within the meaning of 'issue' as used in section 3(11) [sic]."63 The
court rejected this construction and defined "issue" to include "all the
shares of common character originally though successively issued by
the corporation." 4 While a construction of "issue" that limits its
meaning to "each sale" of "originally issued shares of a common
character" clearly would frustrate the registration provisions of the
Act, the court's definition of "issue" just as clearly goes too far in
the opposite direction. It has been suggested that to construe "issue"
to include "all the issued shares of common character though suc-
cessively issued" would make "issue" synonymous with "class." 6 Such
a construction, although perhaps overlooking the Ninth Circuit's use
of the qualifying word "originally," would prevent an issuer from
claiming an intrastate exemption for an offering of its securities if any
of its securities of the same class were ever issued to non-residents,
regardless of any other circumstances. Such a view would also render
meaningless the modifying language "part of an issue" as used in
section 3 (a) ( 11 ).
In sharp contrast to the decision in Shaw, the Commission has
stated that, in order to reach a determination of whether two offerings
constitute a single issue for section 3(a) (11 ) purposes, it will consider
factors identical to those to be considered in the private offering situ-
ation:
Whether an offering is "a part of an issue", that is, whether it is
an integrated part of an offering previously made or proposed to
be made, is a question of fact and depends essentially upon
whether the offerings are a related part of a plan or program.
Thus, the exemption should not be relied upon in combination
with another exemption for the different parts of a single issue
where a part is offered or sold to non-residents.
... Any one or more of the following factors may be determi-
native of the question of integration: (1) are the offerings part
of a single plan of financing; (2) do the offerings involve issu-
ance of the same class of security; (3) are the offerings made at
or about the same time; (4) is the same type of consideration to
be received, and (5) are the offerings made for the same general
purpose. 66
As was the case with the section 4(2) exemption, the Commis-
sion will not hesitate to integrate a prior "intrastate" offering with a
subsequent public offering which is registered under the Act. In Texas
63. Id. at 480.
64. Id.
65. See McCauley, Intrastate Securities Transactions Under the Federal Securi-
ties Act, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 937, 943 (1959), citing L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATIOx
365 n.212 (1951).
66. Securities Act Release No. 4434 (Dec. 6, 1961) (citations omitted) (em-
phasis added).
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Glass Manufacturing Corp.6 7 the issuer, a Texas corporation, sold
approximately 84,000 shares of its common stock from January, 1956,
to June, 1957, in an "intrastate" offering that was registered under
the blue sky laws of that state. In May, 1957, the issuer filed with
the Commission a registration statement for a proposed public offer-
ing of common stock of the same class as that sold in the "intrastate"
offering. The issuer's prospectus stated that the previous sales of the
84,000 shares of its common stock had been exempted by section
3 (a) ( 11 ) from the registration provisions of the Act.
The Division of Corporate Finance of the Commission brought a
proceeding under section 8(d) for a stop order suspending the effec-
tiveness of the issuer's registration statement. The Division con-
tended that the "intrastate" offering and registered public offering
constituted a single issue of securities and should, therefore, be inte-
grated. As a result, the Division argued, no exemption was available
for the sales of the 84,000 shares, and the issuer's registration state-
ment was materially misleading by stating that an exemption was
available and by failing to disclose in the financial statements a con-
tingent liability under section 12(1) arising from its unregistered
sales. In integrating the offerings, the Commission found that they
involved "securities of the same class, [with] no substantial differ-
ences in the circumstances under which they [were] proposed to be
offered or in the purposes of the financing,""8 and, accordingly, held
that the sales of the 84,000 shares constituted "part of the same issue
as the shares covered by the registration statement which [were] to
be offered to non-residents of Texas....
The Commission's indicia in Texas Glass of the application of
the doctrine of integration in a section 3(a) (11) context cuts sharply
against the propriety of an intrastate offering by the corporation in
the Autotex hypothetical. If, as appears likely, the securities previ-
ously sold by the corporation in the private offering and those to be
sold pursuant to the intrastate exemption are determined to constitute
but a single issue, the sale of the corporation's stock in the private
offering to the one non-Maryland resident, the New Yorker, would
destroy the efficacy of a section 3(a) (11) exemption70 for the pro-
67. 38 S.E.C. 630 (1958).
68. Id. at 634. The Commission defined the scope of the section 3(a) (11)
exemption as follows: "The exemption pursuant to Section 3(a) (11) is limited to
cases in which the entire issue is offered and sold exclusively to residents of a single
state, and, if an issuer ...is unsuccessful in selling the entire issue to residents of
that state and offers the rest of the issue, even after registration, to residents of other
states, the exemption is not available." Id.
69. Id.
70. But cf. Smith v. Jackson Tool & Die, Inc., 419 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1969).
In Smith, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to integrate the issuance of
common stock to a non-resident of Mississippi (in exchange for the cancellation
of a promissory note held by the non-resident) into an intrastate Mississippi offering
registered under that state's blue sky laws shortly after the exchange, which offering
involved the same class of security as that issued in the exchange. The only explana-
tion given by the court for its conclusion was that the "exchange differed from the
sale of the ... shares included in the [intrastate] public offering . ..in that pur-
chasers in the public offering paid a fifty cent per share commission or broker's fee
and entered into stock subscription agreements with defendant [issuer], while [the
non-resident] did neither. Also, while the public offering was on the agenda at
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posed intrastate offering. The same rationale may be carried a step
further to preclude an intrastate offering by the corporation, had no
private offering been made, if either or both of the Autotex promoters,
Invent and Improve, were not Maryland residents; if one or more
promoters of a corporation who purchased originally issued equity
securities were, in fact, non-residents and if the corporation within a
time proximate to such issue attempts to make an intrastate offering
of the same class of securities for the same type (albeit a greater
amount) of consideration and for the purpose of raising additional
working capital, then the conclusion is nearly inescapable that the
offerings will be integrated and that the section 3 (a) (11) exemption
will not be available for the latter offering. Although the determi-
nation may be somewhat more difficult, the same result would ap-
pear to be appropriate even if a different class of equity security were
sold in the intrastate offering, assuming that the rights incident to the
two classes of securities were substantially identical.
Forestalled by integration obstacles from making private and
intrastate exempted offerings, and from making even a registered
public offering, the Autotex promoters might consider the third of the
most commonly relied upon exemptions - Regulation A. The ex-
emption afforded under Regulation A is expressly limited to an "issue
of securities" with an aggregate offering price not in excess of
$500,000. As a result, the single-issue concept and its web of integra-
tion problems are also applicable with respect to Regulation A offerings.
The single-issue doctrine arises in connection with a Regulation
A offering with respect to the determination of whether or not the
statutory ceiling on the aggregate offering price has been exceeded.
"The purpose of the dollar limitation on the aggregate amount of an
offering covered by Section 3(b) is to confine the exemption to cases
of small financings." 71 To thus prevent "the segregation of portions
of larger financing operations into separate issues exempt under Regu-
lation A,"'72 the Commission will integrate prior 73 and subsequent 74
stockholder meetings, the exchange of the indebtedness of the corporation to [the
non-resident] for securities was not." Id. at 153.
71. Herbert R. May & Russell H. Phinney, 27 S.E.C. 814, 818 (1948).
72. Id. at 818-19.
73. E.g., Unity Gold Corp., 3 S.E.C. 618 (1938).
74. 27 S.E.C. 814 (1948). May was a proceeding brought by the Trading and
Exchange Division of the Commission under section 15(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 to determine whether the registration as a broker-dealer of
May and Phinney should be revoked for alleged violations of the registration pro-
visions of the Act. In September, 1941, the issuer in question filed a letter of notifica-
tion under Regulation A covering the offering of 74,000 shares of stock to be sold
at one dollar per share. At that time, the statutory ceiling on the aggregate offering
price of securities exempted under Regulation A was $100,000. In February, 1942,
50,000 additional shares were authorized by the issuer and offered for sale. The letter
of notification was not amended to reflect the offering of the 50,000 shares. From
September, 1941, to August, 1945, May and Phinney sold in excess of 100,000 shares
of the issuer's stock for over $125,000.
The Trading and Exchange Division took the position that the 74,000 and
50,000 share blocks constituted a single issue of the issuer's securities and, therefore,
that they should be integrated into a single offering, the totality of which was made in
violation of the registration provisions. The Commission agreed, stating:
Both blocks were distributed on the same general terms and were part of an
uninterrupted program of distribution, with the very same methods of sale and
distribution being employed. Both blocks were issued for the single purpose of
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private offerings into the issue of securities being offered pursuant to
Regulation A. If the aggregate offering price of all of the securities
comprising the integrated issue exceeds $500,000, the exemption will
not be available, and the issuer will be in violation of the registration
provisions of the Act. Assuming that the aggregate offering price of
all of the securities comprising the integrated issue does not exceed
$500,000, the securities sold in the prior or subsequent private offer-
ings would nevertheless be deemed to constitute an illegal unregistered
distribution of shares in a public offering - regardless of the avail-
ability of the Regulation A exemption. Due to its prior $50,000 "pri-
vate placement," if Autotex were to attempt a $500,000 Regulation
A offering, it might receive a letter of comment from the SEC regional
office advising not only that integration requires that the proposed
$500,000 offering be reduced by the amount of its prior offering, but
also that the company's prior "private placement" was in violation of
the registration provisions as a result of the integration doctrine. The
Commission has clearly sounded its warning:
[S]ecurities of the same class, offered on the same general terms
to the public in an uninterrupted program of distribution, cannot
be segregated into separate single "issues" merely by claiming
an exemption for a limited portion of such shares under Rule
[251 et seq.], or under any other rules of the Commission adopted
in accordance with Section 3(b) of the Act, and registering the
remainder. Nor can this be accomplished . . . by the mere
formality of filing successive prospectuses under one or more of
these rules if in fact the shares thereby offered otherwise consti-
tute a single "issue" within the meaning of Section 3 (b).
The determination whether securities are being offered as part
of a single "issue" will depend upon a consideration of various
factors concerning the methods of sale and distribution employed
to effect the offerings and the disposition of the proceeds. If the
offerings may be segregated into separate blocks, as evidenced by
material differences in the use of the proceeds, in the manner and
terms of distribution, and in similar related details, each offering
will be a separate "issue." In the main, of course, each case must
be determined upon the basis of its own facts.75
III. CONCLUSION
An exemption from the registration provisions of the Act often
provides a relatively inexpensive and time-saving means of under-
taking a corporate financing, despite the fact that qualification for an
obtaining funds to meet the installment payments due in connection with thepurchase of the corporation's operating assets and the expenses of commencing
operations. In other words, both blocks, in terms of the class of security, theirpurpose and manner of distribution, constituted a "single" issue of securities.
27 S.E.C. at 819.
75. Unity Gold Corp., 3 S.E.C. 618, 625 (1938). For an excellent discussion ofthe myriad of transactions to which the doctrine of integration may be applicable in
a Regulation A context, see Weiss, Highways and Byways Revisited, 15 N.Y.L.F.
218, 242-44 (1969).
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exemption generally requires that the issuer in some manner limit the
scope of the offering. Such an exemption, however, may be destroyed
by integration if there has been a prior or subsequent offering of the
same issue of securities. The emergence of an integration problem
not only may threaten eradication of the economies of an exempt offer-
ing, but also may impose additional burdens on the issuer and its con-
trol persons. Although criminal penalties may pose an improbable
consequence, administrative sanctions and civil liabilities based on
violations of the Act's registration provisions are likely."6 Such lia-
bilities may necessitate the expenditure of substantial funds for legal
counsel and create a potentially disabling obligation to refund amounts
received from a purportedly exempt financing. A deceptively uncom-
plicated exempt corporate financing may thus become a legal albatross
around the necks of a corporation and its control persons.
Corporate finance efforts may not necessarily be choked off com-
pletely as a result of an integration problem. In a situation in which
a prior exempt offering might be integrated into a proposed regis-
tered public offering, a rescission offer to those who purchased in the
prior offering might take the corporation out of its integration pre-
dicament. Counsel might include such a rescission offer as a part of
the registration statement prepared for the proposed public offering
with little additional cost to the issuer. If the issuer's financial picture
is sanguine enough to allow the issuer to sell the public issue while
permitting its rescission offer to be rejected, the registration route
could provide a remedial solution to integration problems in addition
to a legal path to new capital.
The registered rescission offer resolution of integration problems
may provide small comfort to a company contemplating a subsequent
offering without registration. Frequently, for financial reasons or be-
cause of a shortage of public offering appeal, the issuer may view an
attempted exempt private offering as its only alternative to extinction.
In such a case, the infectious effects of the single issue concept on the
prior and proposed offering may not be curable. The issuer will be
confronted with the choice of incurring possible Securities Act viola-
tions or of undertaking no subsequent financing at all.
A pragmatic but perhaps legally inadvisable approach in circum-
stances in which integration is a possibility but not a certainty is to
undertake the second offering with a plan and a prayer. The plan would
be to make the offering, as if it were by itself exempt, with full dis-
closure - including the implications of potential integration problems."
The presentation to offerees of a well-prepared disclosure statement
would at least reduce the possibility of anti-fraud violations arising
from the offering and start the statute of limitations running with re-
spect to registration violations, if any. The prayer would be that the
company remain appealing enough to its shareholders for the period
in which the applicable statute of limitations would run so as to put
76. See notes 51-56 supra and accompanying text.
77. It will be necessary to disclose the contingent liability of the company that
may arise in the event that the first and second offerings are ultimately integrated
and also are found to be part of one public offering. See discussion of Cameron
Industries at notes 44-50 srupra and accompanying text.
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to rest the possibility of civil liability flowing from a finding of
integration.
Such a "plan-prayer" approach may not be free from the threat
of independent Commission action. Nevertheless, there have been in-
stances in which the Commission staff itself has applied a gentle hand
to potential integration problems. One leader of the securities bar
("Broker Attorney") has related an experience in which the possi-
bility for integration attack seemed ripe, but in which the transactions
somehow passed the Commission staff without objection. A non-public
corporation had filed a registration statement for a common stock
offering at approximately $10 per share. Immediately after filing,
the corporation sought to make a private placement of its common
stock at $5 per share through Broker Attorney's investment banker
client. The proceeds of the private placement were, like the proceeds
of the public offering, to be used for working capital purposes.
Broker Attorney instantly concluded that these facts posed a
clear-cut integration problem. He was, however, advised by counsel
for the corporation that the latter had discussed the matter with the
Commission staff and that the staff had posed no objection. To be cer-
tain that there were no problems, Broker Attorney contacted the staff
himself. The staff informally indicated that the matter indeed looked
like integration and that probably on the basis of existing pronounce-
ments it should be regarded as such. Nonetheless, the staff indicated
a willingness to tolerate the transaction without objection, although
they would not state that it was legal. According to Broker Attorney:
"It appears that perhaps in some measure this tolerance stemmed from
the fact that substantial delays were being encountered by companies
going public for the first time and in many instances without the
infusion of the capital raised on a private placement could not survive
until the registration statement became effective."7 8 The plan-prayer
approach and this latter example of the toleration-survival treatment
by the Commission staff suggest possible pragmatic approaches to
certain integration problems. Neither possibility, however, provides
counsel with a meaningful legal guideline to advise clients.
It is difficult to sympathize with corporations and persons who
incur integration problems in circumstances as extreme as those in
Cameron Industries.79 In cases like Cameron Industries, the close co-
incidence of time and purpose for both the prior claimed exempt offering
and the subsequent public offering reveals an attempted fragmentation
of what really is one financing which is too blatant for the SEC to over-
look. At the same time, the Commission should reconsider the plight
of counsel in search of guidelines when confronted with possible,
though not as clearly defined, integration issues. Otherwise, the doc-
trine of integration, tied as it presently is to numerous vague or
subjective considerations, may provide a trap for the unwary counsel
and the financially needy corporation.
The considerations underlying the single-issue concept, particu-
larly as enunciated in the Commission releases on the private offering
78. Letter dated February 8, 1971, to Ronald M. Shapiro.
79. See note 44 supra.
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and intrastate exemptions, should not be forgotten entirely. Yet inte-
gration should be accomplished only in accordance with an objective
standard. When financings occur at sufficiently distant points in
time, they might well lie beyond the pale of the evils which integration
has been created to extinguish. If offerings, each satisfying all criteria
of the exemption upon which it is made without regard to the issue
of integration, are made at least twelve months apart, it is difficult to
conceive of each such offering as a contrived fragment of an other-
wise single public issue of securities. Financial exigencies of corporate
existence would not seem to permit financial planning built upon
limited offerings at such intervals. The one-year line of demarcation
for computing Regulation A offering amounts suggests that this ap-
proach is at least workable. Furthermore, such a rule could be quali-
fied to ensure against its abuse by limiting the number of non-inte-
grated exempt offerings made pursuant to it to two in any thirty-six-
month period. The danger of a distribution program launched through
a series of annual offerings is thus reduced. Hence, a one-year limit
for integration doctrine application, with built-in controls of distribu-
tion abuse, would offer counsel a significant guide for analyzing the
legality of proposed limited financings. Such a time concept would not
seriously offend the policies which necessitate integration; the possi-
bility of integration would still be a serious consideration with respect
to offerings not falling within the scope of the rule.
Unless and until objective standards are enumerated by the Com-
mission, integration problems will continue to inject uncertainty and
potential liability into the lives of private entrepreneurs like Invent
and Improve. Today a business organization may seem securely fi-
nanced within the parameters of an exemption. Tomorrow such an
exemption may disappear into the quagmire of integration.
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